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Abstract 
Forty years ago, Nasr identified a “crisis of Lebanese capitalism” as a “backdrop” to the country’s 
civil war. Thirty years after Ta’if, Lebanese capitalism is facing another crisis: public debt, looming 
currency crisis, failing public services. Explanations that focus solely on the sectarian “weak state” or 
on Syrian refugees neglect the crucial importance of Lebanon’s dependence on Gulf rentierism. 
Using recent studies of income and poverty, I show how post-war capitalism benefited rentier 
capitalists at the top, created a precarious middle class, and perpetuated poverty. Economic protests 





Forty years ago Salim Nasr identified a “crisis of Lebanese capitalism” as a “backdrop” to the 
country’s civil war (1975-1990).1 Thirty years after the Ta’if agreement helped end the fighting, 
Lebanese capitalism is now facing another severe crisis. The symptoms of the crisis are skyrocketing 
public debt and looming currency crisis, over-reliance on real estate and finance, persistently high 
poverty rates and failures in public services, health, education, and social welfare. The causes of the 
crisis predate the arrival of Syrian refugees after 2011 who have nonetheless become convenient 
scapegoats and a means of extracting aid from the international community. Looking beyond these 
symptoms of the crisis, this article offers an analysis of Lebanon’s political economy: What is the 
cause, the nature, and the effect of the current crisis?  
 
Most commentators place confessional power-sharing at the heart of their analysis of Lebanese 
politics. It is said to enable economic and political liberalism2 but also to weaken the state, disabling 
any effective security or economic policies.3 The World Bank finds that militia leaders and oligarchs 
have “captured” Lebanon’s confessional post-war state under the veil of sectarianism.4 Several 
authors emphasize the continuity of crises over time. Gaspard, for instance, demonstrates the 
persistence of laissez faire economics creating recurring economic crises, while Dib narrates 
Lebanese history as a continuous interplay of “warlords and merchants”.5 Lebanon’s capitalism has 
always been prone to crises but the central symptom of the current crisis is the unprecedented level 
of government debt managed by finance ministry and central bank. Persistent sectarianism and 
state weakness alone simply cannot explain the specific nature of the current malaise. In this article I 
show how transformations of Lebanon’s role in the global and regional political economy helped 
reshape its class structure and state. I then propose a very schematic initial analysis of different 
social classes. A first section sets out Nasr’s analysis of the pre-war Lebanese crisis of capitalism. A 
second section explains changes in Lebanon’s position in the international political economy, and 
how this affected the Lebanese state and class structure during the civil war. The third section shows 
how these wartime shifts led to the integration of Lebanon’s post-war economy into Gulf rentierism 
through finance and real estate. Rentierism here refers to Gulf economic dependency on oil income, 
which in turn radiates out to the wider Arab world through government aid or corporate investment 
to non-oil Arab states such as Lebanon.6 A fourth section sets out a schematic class analysis, using 
recent studies of income and wealth inequality, poverty and deprivation. It benefits rentier 
capitalists at the top, while poverty and inequality remain rife. I argue that the cause of Lebanon’s 
current economic crisis lies not just in a “weak state” overwhelmed by sectarianism but in a 
fundamental shift in Lebanon’s role in the regional and global economy. The crisis produces a rentier 




persistent poverty. This class structure leaves the majority of Lebanese vulnerable to clientelism but 
the depth of the crisis is also starting to erode these mechanisms of sectarian discipline and control. 
A recent rise in economic protests mobilized not the very poorest but the precarious middle. The 
special nature of garbage as an indivisible public good led to widespread protests in the summer of 
2015 when Beirut’s municipall government failed to collect waste. 
 
 
Civil war economy: Lebanon loses its intermediary role 
 
The national pact of 1943 entrenched power sharing between Lebanon’s sects. The unwritten 
agreement divided positions in Lebanon’s state along confessional lines. The president always had to 
be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia 
Muslim. Muslim representatives accepted the principle of Lebanese independence rather than unity 
with Syria, which was the preferred option among the majority of Lebanese Muslims. The Christian 
leaders promised not to accept Western intervention in Lebanon. The two main personalities who 
struck the agreement – Maronite Bechara el Khoury and Sunni Riad al Soh – were not only 
representing their communities but also the bourgeoisie of their confessional groups.7 Confessional 
peace and an independent Lebanese republic run along laissez faire lines were beneficial to 
merchants and financiers from all sects. While Christians tended to dominate trade with the West, 
Sunni merchants were dominant in trade with the Arab East. Lebanon came to occupy a unique role 
as intermediary between Europe and America on one hand, and Arab East on the other.8 Beirut 
attracted capital fleeing war or nationalization in Palestine, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. Lebanon’s 
“merchant republic” ran a laissez faire economy with minimal state interference and public services.9 
Consociational power-sharing democracy and minimal public services meant voters had to rely on 
confessional politicians – zu’ama – to access education, health services, and jobs.10  
 
Nasr’s 1978 article showed that Lebanon’s intermediary role led to a preponderance of banking and 
finance.11 The collapse of Intrabank in 1966 led to a changing of the guard: Local financiers declined 
and Western capital stepped in to recycle “petrodollars” that were flowing through Beirut. Within 
Lebanon, banks preferred financing real estate over industry. Some key trading houses monopolized 
this sector. Agriculture came under the purview of big capitalist owners, causing a rural crisis and 




the newcomers.12 By the early 1970s, the crisis of Lebanese capitalism was not one of insufficient 
economic growth but entrenched structural inequality. This is an important point: Authors who 
dismiss the role of “economic factors” in the outbreak of the civil war point to strong growth 
induced by Lebanese petrodollar recycling.13 This downplays Lebanon’s long-term social crisis. 
 
The social crisis spurred new popular movements. The build up to the Lebanese civil war is often 
narrated as a conflict of sectarian parties, stirred up by the struggle of the Palestinian national 
movement and Israel.14 The bigger picture was the rise of social protest. Popular movements were 
forming from the grassroots up, challenging the traditional sectarian leadership.15 Some of these 
movements were secular and non-sectarian, while others represented a mobilization of the 
confessional group outside the control of established zu’ama. This mobilization would have been 
impossible without the mass migration from rural areas to Beirut weakening patronage ties.16 
Sectarianism overlay the differential integration into the urban labor market, with the bulk of 
migrants being Shia from South Lebanon. They lived amongst Palestinian refugees, who started 
arming themselves after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war. The crisis of Lebanese capitalism was thus 
not independent of sectarianism or international politics. It exacerbated those features. 
 
Lebanon’s oligarchic rule provoked a reaction not just “from below” but also from military and 
technocratic elites that wanted to pursue statist economic policies akin to those of “developmental 
states” elsewhere in the developing world. After a brief episode of civil war in 1958, army general 
Fouad Chehab emerged as a compromise candidate for the presidency. He and his successor Charles 
Helou’s efforts at installing a more developmentalist state challenged the economic interests of 
Lebanon’s financial and merchant oligarchy. The introduction of planning and statistics underpinned 
an expansion of education and infrastructure provision. The general-turned-president Fouad Chehab 
built up the repressive muscle of the Lebanese state through the intelligence agencies. The most 
relevant innovation for the purposes of this article was the establishment of a central bank in 1964. 
It actively regulated finance, helped manage the Intrabank collapse of 1966, and encouraged the 
entry of Western banks into the Lebanese economy.17 
 
When civil war broke out in 1975, foreign banks were looted. Most left Beirut and many remaining 
banks came to serve the militia economy. The civil war thus ended Lebanon’s role as financial 




1975 and 1982, and collapse from 1982 to 1990. Resilience was primarily due to the international 
political economy.18 Outside militia funding stabilized the economy. Lebanese migration to the Gulf 
led to rising remittances and industrial exports. Emigration gave birth to a new diaspora bourgeoisie 
of Lebanese who became contractors in the Gulf during the oil boom.19 The breakdown of the state 
was uneven. The army fragmented but remained a significant actor. The government lost its main 
source of income from customs and tariffs when militias seized the ports.20 However, the 
government continued to pay salaries and even engaged in some reconstruction. During one of the 
lulls of the civil war in 1976-1977 the President and former central bank governor Elias Sarkis 
established the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and endowed it with exceptional 
powers.21 Sarkis was a protégé of former President Fouad Chehab and acted in the tradition of the 
state developmentalism established by this predecessor.  In this sense, the CDR was a  “Chehabist” 
institution that came to play a central role in post-war reconstruction. After the Israeli invasion of 
1982 it briefly looked like the civil war was coming to an end. Several Lebanese-born Gulf 
contractors bought up local banks and Rafiq Hariri made plans to rebuild central Beirut, which he 
was to realize in the 1990s.22 The war did not end. Syria rallied its local allies to oppose President 
Amin Gemayel who had signed a withdrawal agreement with Israel, which would have been a de-
facto peace agreement between Lebanon and the Jewish state.  The return to conflict in early 1984 
eventually led to currency collapse. The pillars of resilience that had propped up the Lebanese 
economy were knocked over.23 Much of foreign militia funding disappeared, the oil price collapse led 
to falling remittances and exports. The Lebanese economy was on its knees but currency collapse 
was also helped along by coordinated rounds of speculation.24  
 
The civil war after 1983 was a threefold struggle. The sectarian dimension concerned the 
renegotiation of the confessional power-sharing formula, which occurred at Ta’if. The second 
dimension was international. Syria struggled for dominance in Lebanon by excluding Israeli influence 
as well as any potential Lebanese opposition. Damascus largely achieved this goal. Major powers, 
including the United States and Saudi Arabia, accepted Syria’s dominant role in Lebanon.25 Finally, 
the civil war was a struggle over the post-war economic order. President Gemayel’s (1982-1988) 
business ally Roger Tamraz was building a commercial empire in competition with some of the Gulf 
contractors.26 Tamraz’ empire in turn failed in 1988 when Gemayel’s term ended and he could no 
longer protect the ventures. Various militia leaders were making money from trade in fuel and food, 






The post-war economic growth record was mixed. Annual real GDP growth averaged a strong 6.2 
percent from 1992 to 1996 and an even stronger 9.5 percent from 2007 to 2010, but slumped to 2.3 
percent from 1997 to 2006 and 1.9 percent from 2011 to 2017.28 Real per capita GDP in US dollar 
terms increased by 47.2 percent between 1992 and 2010 but by 2017  it had declined by 18.1 
percent due to lackluster growth and the influx of Syrian refugees. Since 1992 Lebanon avoided a 
return of currency crises. This apparent stability and the recurring albeit somewhat lackluster long-
term growth hides structural problems. The most obvious and most worrying sign of this malaise is 
government debt at 153 percent of GDP in 2017, the third highest in the world after Greece and 
Japan.29 Lebanon has been running persistent current account deficits which were in the double 
digits in 19 of the past 25 years. 30 Lebanon funds this deficit through the constant inflow of short 
term capital. Foreign direct investment is dependent on the Gulf and narrowly focused on real 
estate. Lebanon is overly dependent on remittances which stood at over 20 percent of GDP annually 
for most years during the 2000s. This represents yet another avenue of Gulf dependency as much of 
this diaspora is located in the Gulf. Lebanon’s economic slowdown since 2011 is partly due to 
declining remittances at a “mere” 15.3 percent of GDP in 2017. These remittances are crucial to 
keep financing the government budget and current account deficits.31  
 
Sectarian power-sharing is one the causes of the shortcomings of the post-war economy.32 Ta’if 
produced the mutual obstruction of the “troika” of president, prime minister, and speaker working 
at cross-purposes and vetoing each other while seeking to maximize their share of economic rents, 
thus reproducing the “weak state”. Predation by Damascus regime figures further hurt the economy 
prior to the Syrian withdrawal of 2005. Lebanon’s system of dividing the spoils among sectarian 
politicians is a key cause of Lebanon’s crisis, but it is only one aspect of Lebanon’s political economy. 
The central bank, which is probably the key institution of post-war capitalism in Lebanon, is hardly 
“weak”.33 The policies that caused debt and failing services are not solely due to Syrian predation. 
With Hariri, a representative of the new Gulf contractor bourgeoisie took charge of reconstruction. 
He turned Lebanon into an outlet of Gulf capital in finance and real estate.34 Hariri’s policies took 
account of the fact that Lebanon had lost its role as intermediary between East and West and was 
not going to regain it. Real estate and finance were the main draw for outside capital. In 1991 the 
Lebanese parliament passed a law that enabled the transfer of property rights from the several tens 
of thousands of individual owners in central Beirut to a single real estate developer dubbed 




center created enormous rents for Solidere investors and for developers who had secured a plot in 
the area. The state played a central role by transferring and securing property rights to the private 
developer. The CDR, the very agency which had been founded as a highly autonomous state 
instrument of Chehabist technocrats in 1977, partnered with Solidere in developing central Beirut. 
Solidere was an example of neoliberal urbanism, where the state enables accumulation at the urban 
scale. Much of this accumulation was driven by Gulf capital, not least Hariri himself, who was a 
major shareholder in Solidere.36 Central Beirut was symptomatic of Lebanon’s luxury real estate 
boom but permissive regulatory policies fostered hundreds of “mini-Solideres” across Beirut, where 
high rise luxury apartment blocks were replacing Ottoman- or Mandate era villas.37 
 
Beirut’s city center is the more visible sign of Lebanese malaise, but government debt is the time 
bomb that could blow up the Lebanese economy. The main debt creation engine was not the cost of 
reconstructing physical infrastructure but currency stabilization.38 In order to avoid the crippling 
currency crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, the central bank pegged the Lebanese pound to the US 
dollar at LL1,500 in 1997. High interest rates were the main vehicle for managing the currency, 
especially on government debt. Gaspard argues that the state over-paid on this interest, leading 
Lebanon into a debt trap.39 The beneficiaries were Lebanese commercial banks who snapped up 
treasury bills, and the depositors who were financing the banks’ purchase of government debt. The 
system is reliant on a continuous inflow of capital from outside Lebanon to feed the deposit base. 
Two factors kept the merry-go-round going.40 Firstly, most government debt is held by domestic 
banks rather than more fickle foreign investors.41 Banks and government are mutual hostages. The 
banks also know how to draw in deposits from the Lebanese diaspora. Secondly, investors perceive 
an “implicit guarantee” by donors.42 The 2002 Paris II conference stabilized the Lebanese economy 
through donor loans originating mainly in the Gulf. During the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006 Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait deposited a combined $1.5 billion with the central bank to bolster the currency. 
Gulf support for Lebanon’s dollar peg has helped Lebanon stay afloat. 
 
Lebanon’s economy thus revolves around rent-creation mechanisms such as government debt 
management and urban “reconstruction”. Most ordinary Lebanese were unable to participate in 
these schemes.43 Gulf contractors, the Lebanese diaspora – many of whom are in the Gulf – and the 
businessmen and warlords who benefited from the militia economy were able to earn most of the 
rent. Lebanon’s economic elite is closely networked to, or congruent with, the political elite. The 




Lebanese banks illustrates the politicized nature of banking: 18 of the 20 major banks of 2014 had 
major shareholders linked to political elites and he attributes 43 percent of assets in the banking 
sector to political control.44 In some ways this is another iteration of what Dib had  referred to as the 
longstanding coalition of “warlords and merchants”, but the current situation and the nature of the 
current crisis differ from the political constellations of previous eras.45 The importance of the Gulf 
and the diaspora, as well as the role of “strong” state agencies  in stabilizing these schemes – not 
least the central bank –are novel aspects of Lebanon’s political economy.  
 
The economic downturn since 2011 was largely caused by the Syrian conflict, including the influx of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees. It hit economic growth and has exacerbated pressures on public 
services but it did not cause Lebanon’s crisis of capitalism. About one million Syrians are registered 
as refugees with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), with an unknown number of Syrians in the 
country who are not registered.46 The negative and positive effects on “the economy” are borne by 
different groups.47 Lebanon’s rentier capitalists suffer from a reduction in tourism and subsequent 
demand for real estate. This has dampened the appetite of Gulf investors and diaspora Lebanese to 
invest. Lebanese who were renting out accommodation or selling consumer goods or services to 
Syrians benefited from rising demand. Employers in such low wage sectors such as construction, 
agriculture or hospitality benefited from the influx of labor, not least because most Syrians are 
employed informally. Lebanese living in areas where Syrian refugees were fleeing to would see 
additional pressures on public services, which are anyhow provided insufficiently.48 Unskilled 
workers would experience greater competition from Syrians. The economic interests of utilizing 
cheap Syrian labor have also influenced Lebanese refugee policy, such as non-encampment.49 The 
influx of Syrians provides profit opportunities for retailers and landlords, while putting additional 
pressure on Lebanon’s poor and economically vulnerable. 
 
The expansion of real estate and finance was driven by strong state institutions manned by Hariri-
appointed technocrats.50 There was a crucial difference in the way that Hariri and the pre-war 
bourgeoisie were building state institutions in Lebanon. While the former were protecting the 
laissez-faire “merchant republic” from the encroachment of the more developmentalist Chehabist 
state, Hariri technocrats repurposed the very artefacts of the Chehabist experiment for neoliberal 
policies in finance and urbanism. While Hariri strengthened what Bourdieu had called the “right 
hand” of state concerned with economic management – the central bank, the finance ministry – 




patronage instruments. 51 This included the Council for the South, the Ministry of the Displaced, the 
ministry of social affairs, the health ministry and others. This public sector growth was a natural 
development for a state that had been emasculated by civil war but jobs were often also a 
patronage resource of sectarian politicians.52 Politicians were channeling public services to their 
clientele. Chaaban and Salti have showed that the geographical distribution of government 
expenditures on education, health, and social welfare was not driven by need but matched the 
sectarian demographic composition of different localities.53 The military and intelligence apparatus 
also expanded, especially while it enjoyed Syrian patronage before Damascus withdrew its troops in 
2005. 
 
Rentiers versus the rest 
 
Several studies over the past twenty years have looked at Lebanese inequality in incomes and 
wealth, and at poverty or deprivation.54 They come to similar conclusions: inequality is high and 
poverty and deprivation are persistent. The most comprehensive and recent analysis from Lydia 
Assouad finds that the top 10 percent of income earners accounted for 57.1 percent of income in 
2014, while the bottom 50 percent accounted for 10.6 percent. In terms of wealth, she finds that the 
top 10 percent gather almost 70 percent of total personal wealth.55 Various studies over the years 
found that slightly more than a quarter of Lebanese live in poverty or deprivation.56 The tax system is 
hardly progressive.57  
 
As Traboulsi has pointed out, studies of income and poverty tell us little about class because “the 
organization of incomes into a pyramid takes place without examining the source of these incomes 
(i.e. labor, profit, interest, rent, etc.) and regardless of the economic sector in which they are earned, 
or the ownership of capital and the means and instruments of production.”58 My analysis goes 
beyond arranging income in pyramids and tries to provide a very schematic “class analysis” in two 
ways. Firstly, I relate the incomes of Lebanon’s richest to the rent-creation mechanisms that I have 
set out in my previous analysis. Secondly, I look at the characteristics of households that are ranked 
as poor or deprived in the various studies and relate them to the types of wage- or non-wage labor 
they perform, and the sectors they work in. This analysis provides a “backdrop” – in Nasr’s 
terminology – to the recent rise in popular mobilization against the failure of public services, for 





At the top of the pyramid are rentier capitalists. Government debt management is a key source of 
rent in the financial sector. Lebanese commercial banks are the main lender to the Lebanese 
government and central bank. Banking is highly concentrated: Citing data from 2014, Chaaban finds 
that the three banks with the greatest total consolidated assets hold 45 percent of the sector’s total 
assets, while the ten leading banks hold almost 90 percent.59 The second layer of beneficiaries are 
depositors who earn high interest rates. The IMF estimated that the largest 1 percent of deposit 
accounts hold half of total deposits, with the largest 0.1 percent holding 20 percent in 2015.60 One 
IMF working paper noted that anecdotal evidence suggests the Lebanese diaspora is the largest 
group of depositors.61 Real estate is another large source of rents. Solidere is the biggest real estate 
project in Lebanon but similar mechanics can be observed across various areas of Beirut, where old 
Ottoman or Mandate era houses have to make way for luxury high risers. Fattouh noted that few 
Lebanese had the savings to participate in finance or real estate schemes.62 Wealth begets wealth 
through access to financial and real estate rent. Assouad finds that wealth is extremely 
concentrated. Using data from Forbes and Arabian business magazines, she estimates that Lebanese 
“billionaires’ wealth represents 30 percent of total national income on average over 1990-2016, 
surpassing by far what we observe in other countries using the same data.”63 Forbes’ most current 
ranking of billionaires suggests that the source of wealth of Lebanon’s seven biggest tycoons lies in 
the Gulf: Four members of the Hariri family are listed to be worth a combined $6.2 billion, while 
Taha and Najib Miqat together own $5.5 billion.64 Both families originally amassed their wealth 
through Gulf contracting and both had a family member assume the post of prime minister.65 Only 
one Lebanese billionaire – Robert Mouawad at $1.6 billion – does not trace the origin of his wealth 
to the Gulf. At the same time, Lebanon is a tough place for small entrepreneurs to become wealthy. 
Small and medium sized businesses are in a precarious position. Lebanon’s low rank of 133 of 190 in 
the World Bank “Doing Business” index suggests that those businesses that do not enjoy close 
connections to the apex of the political pyramid face a lot of red tape.66 Financing is difficult to come 
by from commercial banks, although central bank programs have made some more funding 
available.67  
 
Assouad does not measure poverty, but various studies of poverty or deprivation published between 
2007 and 2015 put the number of poor or deprived Lebanese at between 20 and 27 percent.68 The 
lower 50 percent of the income pyramid thus splits into half: those struggling to stay above the 




rely on three studies on poverty or deprivation published by various Lebanese government and 
international development organizations between 2007 and 2015.69 While they employ different 
concepts and measures of welfare – living standards, income, or expenditure – their results do point 
to the characteristics that make households vulnerable to deprivation or poverty. 
 
Unsurprisingly, unemployment is associated with poverty.70 Furthermore, salaried employment 
tends to keep Lebanese out of poverty, while most of Lebanon’s poor were in non-salaried 
employment: either paid on a weekly, hourly or piece rate basis or were self-employed.71 In 2009, 
“monthly paid employees” accounted for only half of those in employment.72 The scarce but 
valuable good of salaried employment is thus a patronage resource for politicians who can dole out 
jobs in the public sector.73 Those households where the head was employed in agriculture or 
construction saw the highest rates of extreme poverty, while public sector workers and those in 
services saw the lowest incidents of poverty.74 It is precisely this relatively more secure segment of 
salaried employees and particularly public sector employees which has been the driver of renewed 
labor militancy since about 2012, a point that I will return to later. Widespread poverty among 
construction workers suggests that the rents earned in Lebanese real estate were based on the 
extreme exploitation of labor. Poverty and deprivation are also matters of geography.75 Given the 
concentration of rents from real estate and finance in Beirut’s banks, Solidere, and other high-end 
construction projects, it is hardly surprising that the capital had the lowest rates of poverty and 
deprivation in Lebanon in 2004. Mount Lebanon and Nabatieh had below-average poverty rates, 
while rates in the Bekaa and the South were above average.76 The North had the highest rates. 
Those areas which rely most extensively on agriculture but see little trickle-down from Beirut’s 
finance and real estate wealth are thus the poorest regions in Lebanon.  
 
Much of the top ten percent of income earners in Lebanon can afford alternatives to the poor 
condition of public services such as health, education, water and electricity. Poorer Lebanese are 
more reliant on patronage resources doled out by politicians or confessional charities. Poverty and 
deprivation are associated with low educational achievement. Poverty is low among those who 
attended secondary school and very low among those with university education.77 Education is the 
key to reproducing middle class existence and to economic security. The quality of schools varies. 
More than half of students were attending private fee-paying schools, with just less than a third 
going to public schools and 13 percent in private non-fee-paying schools in 2009-2010.78 




instance by providing school places in prestigious schools or by reducing fees. Schools catering 
mainly or exclusively to particular religious communities are a way of reproducing sectarian 
identities. 40.2 percent of university students were attending the public Lebanese University.79 More 
prestigious but expensive English- or French-language universities such as the American University of 
Beirut (AUB) or St Joseph provide much enhanced job prospects. The quality of education thus 
depends on the ability to pay. This is how societal advantage becomes reproduced from one 
generation to another. 
 
The top ten percent of income earners are also better able to cope with the inequalities of 
Lebanon’s health system. 90 percent of hospital beds are in private institutions, while ambulatory 
care takes place mainly in private health centers and pharmacies.80 Health insurance coverage is far 
from universal and does not cover all treatments. Only 46.2 percent of heads of household were 
insured in 2004.81 Most insured are in the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), which covers 
employees in the formal sector, followed by the army fund and some other public sector schemes. 
Again, we can see how government employment acts as a shield to the effects of poverty and 
deprivation. Very few are in private insurance. Health coverage is thus tied to regular employment, 
often in the public sector.82 While the ministry of health is mandated to pay for hospitalization of 
uninsured Lebanese, lack of clear rules and lack of capacity in the ministry provided scope for 
corruption and hospitals overcharging both the state and patients.83 Building and running health 
centers is a form of “bricks and mortar clientelism” by politicians and confessional charities 
associated with politicians.84  
 
A World Bank survey published in 2009 found that, while connection to the public water system had 
improved, only about a quarter of connected households actually received water every day.85 
Lebanese do not trust the quality of water and only about half use it for drinking.86 Households use 
bottled water or go to water trucks. Lebanese households spend more on those alternative water 
sources than on water from the tap.87 High end apartment blocks often dig their own wells, 
circumventing public water supply and showing once again that Lebanon’s wealthy elite is able to 
cope with failing public services. Intermittent supply and poor water quality impose considerable 
costs on households, especially the poorer ones, and represent a health risk. Verdeil finds that, given 
Lebanon’s relatively abundant water supply for a Middle Eastern country, “the inadequacy of 
Beirut’s drinking water supply exemplifies the persistence of public service dysfunction after twenty 




reconstruction, the undersupply of sufficient drinking water is an indictment of the process. Eid 
Sabbagh finds that Lebanon’s political elites are unable to address the water issue as it “acts 
following a logic of power reproduction centered on the control of financial resources, control over 
administrative bodies, and the division of territory.”89 
 
Electricity production is inequitable. The one success of Lebanon’s reconstruction in the sector was 
to add generator capacity in the 1990s but capacity now lags far behind demand. State-owned 
electricity company Electricité du Liban (EDL) never recovered the ability to collect all bills and much 
electricity is accessed through informal connections. Despite the technical capability to do so, 
Lebanese power stations never switched from the more expensive oil as a fuel to the cheaper gas. 
EDL does not produce enough electricity and it suffers from continuous financial deficits that the 
ministry of finance then has to pay for. Privatization plans became a tussle between politicians 
seeking to benefit investors, and others seeking to protect their clientele’s interests in accessing 
electricity free of charge. The rolling power cuts with which EDL rations electricity are applied 
inequitably. Beirut experiences relatively shorter cuts while areas outside of the capital suffer 
extensive outages. The Lebanese resort to privately owned generators. World Bank data published in 
2009 show that a third of all Lebanese electricity comes from private generators, 58 percent of 
households use some form of self-generated electricity, and that households spent $330 million on 
privately generated electricity in 2008.90 Most Lebanese are billed twice: By EDL and by a local 
private provider. Again, wealthier Lebanese find it easier to cope with the state’s failure to provide 
electricity than poorer ones, and those outside of Beirut suffer more than those in the capital. 
 
In the summer of 2015, Beirut experienced a severe trash crisis. Garbage collection had been 
privatized after the civil war and was no longer a municipal responsibility. In Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon, garbage collection was handled by Sukleen, a company run by a former business partner of 
Rafiq Hariri.91 Data cited by Abu Rish suggest that Sukleen was yet another rent-creation mechanism: 
The price it charged the Lebanese government was four times the global average.92 In 2015 
Sukleen’s contract ran out but Lebanon’s confessional elites could not agree on a new rent-sharing 
formula. Furthermore, the Naameh site where much of Beirut’s garbage had ended up was closed. It 
had far exceeded its capacity and local residents were protesting its continued use. The crisis is 
interesting because, unlike health, education, electricity, or water, there is no private alternative to 
waste collection. It is a public good that is not easily divided into, or provided as, a private good. It is 




reason why the 2015 “trash crisis” mobilized strong popular protests around the “You Stink” 
movement.93 
 
The crisis of Lebanese capitalism and social protest 
 
 
The post-war economic model pits the rentiers against the rest. Hariri and his technocrats were the 
architects of the post-war economy. The other members of the political elite provided little 
fundamental opposition to Hariri’s neoliberal policies. They sought to extract a share of rents 
instead. Theirs was the logic of “muhassasa”, the division of spoils typical of post-war politics.94 This 
did lead to a rise in rudimental welfare state institutions run along clientelist lines by sectarian 
politicians. This form of welfare provision is costly and fails to address the pressing needs of the 
poorest. Cammett had referred to building health centers and schools in return for votes at election 
time as “bricks and mortar clientelism” of.95 Nucho points out that this provision of infrastructure 
reproduces “everyday sectarianism”.96 Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, and Mikaelian have 
argued that sectarianism envelops the Lebanese population in a form of Foucauldian 
governmentality.97 Clientelism is a powerful structural force to keep the Lebanese in their sectarian 
place. There is, however, growing evidence that such control is not absolute and is eroding as the 
crisis of Lebanese capitalism deepens the country’s social crisis and elicits protests.  
 
The polarization of Lebanese society has contributed to a rise in contentious politics, including street 
protests, strikes, and electoral contestation from non-sectarian newcomers. Notably, the working 
poor who are concentrated in agriculture and construction generally fail to mobilize.98 Political elites 
had managed to undercut the independence of the main trade union confederation at its leadership 
election in 1997.99 It was only fifteen years later that more independent trade unions were stepping 
out of the shadow of the emasculated umbrella group. Public sector employees came together as 
the Union Coordination Committee (UCC) to demand wage adjustment in a series of strikes and 
protests between 2012 and 2015. Bou Khater explains the UCC’s success with reference to the large 
number of workers it represented, the fact that the state as an employer was its main target, and its 
democratic structures.100 On the one hand, public sector employment is tainted with clientelism. On 
the other hand it is a major site of labor mobilization that confronts the economic inequality that 




spike in studies which take the Lebanese state seriously and suggests more of such research is 
needed.101 
 
Among the most high profile instances of protest were the demonstrations against the failure to 
collect garbage in Beirut in the summer of 2015. On 29 August tens of thousands congregated in the 
streets of central Beirut putting forward a coherent set of demands: the resignation of the 
environment minister, the resignation of those in the security apparatus and the cabinet found 
responsible for previous police violence against demonstrators, and a long term environmentally 
sustainable solution to the garbage crisis.102 These minimal goals hid a wider divergence of views, 
including a notable segment of the protestors who were adopting the slogans of “Arab spring” 
protestors: “the people want the fall of the regime”. This begged the question what the “regime” 
was. Protestors also chanted that “all means all”, putting blame on political movements and factions 
across the whole political spectrum, including Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and Hizballah, 
which had themselves often posed as outsiders challenging a failing state. A previous attempt at 
building a “non-sectarian” movement in 2011 had failed partly because the terms of what “the 
regime” was had been so vague as to allow partisans of sectarian parties to join the protest, 
rendering it meaningless.103 Whereas Ben Ali had personified the regime in Tunisia, and Mubarak in 
Egypt, targeting individual Lebanese politicians for accountability always carried the stigma of 
sectarian motivation. Since ministers represented “their” confessional group and party, holding a 
minister to account for her or his failings could be interpreted as an attack on the standing of that 
group. This mind set makes ministerial accountability nigh impossible. The garbage protest thus 
brought about an important change in tone. Politicians reacted with repression, mobilizing the 
security forces against protestors, rounding up perceived ringleaders, and making use of their 
formidable party- and media machinery to delegitimize the protests. The crackdown once again 
belies the notion of a Lebanese “weak state”. Faced with a protest movement that formulated a 
fundamental challenge to the economic and political control of Lebanon’s sectarian elite cartel, 
these leaders launched the state’s repressive capabilities.104 The garbage protest brought forth 
electoral alliances such as “Beirut Madinati” run by professionals and activists who seek to challenge 
the sectarian logic of Lebanese policy making but thus far fail to mobilize the electorate 
effectively.105 While elections still churn out reliable majorities for political elites, elite control 







The weakness of the Lebanese state and its capture by self-serving elites is undeniable but it is not 
the sole cause of the current crisis. Syrian refugees exacerbated the crisis but did not cause it. A key 
factor is the long-term shift in Lebanon’s role in the regional and global economies: From 
intermediary between Arab East and the West in the pre-war period, to the integration into circuits 
of Gulf rentierism in the post-war period. The policies that paved the way to this dependency were 
put in place by Lebanese-born Saudi contractor Rafiq Hariri. This reshaped Lebanon’s class structure. 
The pre-war bourgeoisie receded, while billionaires who accumulated their wealth in the Gulf are 
now at its apex. Moreover, the country is dependent on remittances from the large Lebanese 
diaspora, a large and wealthy section of which is based in the Gulf. Gulf governments stepped in 
with financial aid at various points when Lebanon’s currency peg came under pressure, most 
dramatically during the Israeli war in 2006. The cause of Lebanon’s crisis of capitalism is thus not 
simply the recurring problem of sectarian society overwhelming a weak state, but a profound 
change in Lebanon’s international political economy. Nor was the state universally weak: Those 
sections of the state concerned with creating and stabilizing rents in finance and real estate are 
strong, especially the central bank.106Finance and real estate boosted the wealth of a rentier 
capitalist class that stretches beyond Lebanon’s borders. A quarter of Lebanese citizens, meanwhile, 
are suffering poverty and deprivation, with Syrian and Palestinian refugees adding to the number of 
poor. Waged labor allows Lebanese to escape the worst ravages of poverty but leaves even public 
sector workers in a precarious financial situation. Insufficient public services in education, health, 
water, and electricity are escapable problems for the wealthy. For politicians they are also patronage 
resources with which to control the poorer sections of society.  
 
What remains constant across the capitalist crises of the 1970s and the current one is the 
unwillingness and inability of Lebanon’s political elite to resolve it and create a sustainable and 
equitable alternative. The country’s only hope appears to be contention “from below”. Since 
Lebanese capitalism and sectarianism are deeply intertwined, this countermovement must go 
beyond sectarian divisions. The precedent of the 1970s shows that popular movements can slip into 
sectarianism and violence. The current crisis of Lebanese capitalism is in some ways less dangerous 
than that of the 1970s. Firstly, the depth of deprivation and poverty were greater in the 1970s. 
Secondly, the anti-status quo forces in Lebanon could team up with armed Palestinian factions. 
Syrian refugees provide no scope for similar military or ideological alliances. There is one way, 




out despite strong economic growth, while the current crisis may trigger a currency collapse. This 
would result in a sudden erosion of living standards that could in turn lead to a severe political 
shock. Several recent studies have suggested that the end of the road may be nigh for Lebanon’s 
unsustainable currency peg.107 The sheer scale of the underlying structural problem, the Syrian war 
and refugee crisis, and the reduction in remittances all point to a decline in capital inflows from 
abroad. Gulf support for the currency peg has grown more uncertain.108 While many of the top 
depositors would be able to salvage their capital – they are likely to be the first to move their capital 
out and thus precipitate a crisis – living standards at the opposite end of the social spectrum would 
plummet. Many of those whose salaried employment – often in the public sector – protects them 
from the very worst deprivation would immediately slip below the poverty line. The political effects 
of such a shock would be hard to predict. 
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